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Some readers, picking up this book and finding it to be an analysis of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict from the perspective of international law, might well be tempted to put it back down. A jaded view would be understandable. No conflict over the last century has proved itself more impervious to the norms and rules of international law—particularly international humanitarian law, the law of war and occupation. The conflict’s history is littered with the detritus of failed legal efforts, including a multitude of UN resolutions (ignored or vetoed), analyses by foreign ministries, forgotten academic studies, and thousands of human rights reports by nongovernmental organisations reporting the same violations of law noted in earlier reports and demanding action that is never forthcoming. Even an advisory opinion by the International Court of Justice, the highest authority on the interpretation of international law, has not impacted events on the ground. In light of this dismal history, it was not surprising that the findings of this study, when first presented to the public in London and Cape Town in 2009, were met in both cities by audience members who first rose to ask, ‘fine, but why should we care?’
Nonetheless, this study must be recognised as essential, precisely because it responds to the past futility of international law and, more generally, the world’s failure to resolve this tortuous conflict. The scale of that failure is sobering. As this book goes to press, Israel’s occupation of the West Bank, East Jerusalem and Gaza Strip has not only lasted forty-five years but shows every sign of having entrenched irrevocably. The driving condition of the conflict—Israel’s formation in part of Mandate Palestine, while the rest of the territory and millions of its native people remain stateless—has endured for sixty-four years and appears similarly intractable. Although alarmed, the world’s community of states has mostly slumped toward ennuie and fatalism regarding a problem that has plagued the United Nations since its inception. But continuing international paralysis has become untenable. The conflict between Israel and the Palestinians has its own drama, pathos, and human suffering, which have compelled the sympathy and concern of many, but it has also created toxic spin-offs for international security globally. Now the mass revolutions of the Arab Spring have raised the ante, while debunking some of the conflict’s ideological gloss in the West of a Manichaean battle between western liberal democracy and revanchist Arab and Islamic terror. At this volatile and sensitive juncture, as Middle East regimes are violently transformed, any proposal that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict should remain subjected to the shallow pageantry of the ‘peace process‘ is clearly unsustainable. It has become imperative to examine past efforts frankly in order to determine why all have failed so badly—to look at the entire conflict with fresh and critical eyes.
That effort, made in this book, finds that the conflict now faces a paradigm shift. For decades, international lawyers have understood the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as a case of belligerent occupation—which is, indeed, incontestably the situation in the West Bank, East Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip, a legal fact that this study takes as its point of departure. Thus scholars have assumed that the relevant international law is international humanitarian law, particularly the Fourth Geneva Convention, which establishes the rights of the population under occupation and related responsibilities of the Occupying Power. This approach has generated the decades of (mostly fruitless) scholarship mentioned earlier, including cycles of unproductive argument about whether humanitarian law truly applies and exhaustive documentation of Israel’s violations of this or that provision of it. But concentrating narrowly on humanitarian law, while technically correct, has introduced a debilitating analytical error by obscuring recognition that Israel’s occupation also involves a crime against humanity. This discovery is no mere technicality. Recognising that Israel is perpetrating illegal regimes in the OPT illuminates different motives, logics and constraints driving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and so sheds new light on prospects for its resolution.
Since the late 1940s, international efforts to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict have generally adopted the interpretation that it involves ‘two peoples in one land’. This was the paradigm that guided the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 181 of 1947, which proposed partition of Mandate Palestine into a ‘Jewish state’ and an ‘Arab state’. As discussed in these pages, this paradigm was in fact not universally held in the 1940s and arguably did not reflect international ‘consensus’ as we would understand it today. Yet the model has concretised over time, such that, by the 1990s, the solution to Israel’s belligerent occupation was universally understood as Israel’s withdrawal from the occupied Palestinian territories (OPT) to allow partition of Mandate Palestine into two states. 
Thus the world’s absorption with coaxing Israel into making this essential step, which appears—to international stakeholders as well as Israel’s allies and many Israeli citizens—so obviously necessary to Israel’s survival as a Jewish state, as well as a stable peace. And thus collective bafflement at the stark failure of the Oslo process to achieve this outcome. Even the most diligent efforts by the Palestinian Authority to satisfy Israel’s terms for withdrawal—repressing all open Palestinian resistance to Israel’s occupation, through measures admitted by Israel to be generally successful—have not even slowed down the growth of Israeli civilian settlements in East Jerusalem and the West Bank. Vast, elaborate and immensely expensive development projects, the Jewish settlements are clearly designed to be permanent, especially as they are linked into Israel through equally elaborate and expensive grids of civil infrastructure. That such a major project must reflect a geostrategic imperative of the State is demonstrated by the obvious paradox that the settlements actually increase insecurity to Jewish civilians, by positioning them in such close proximity to people made only more hostile to their presence by the land invasions and annexations that settlement construction entails. So stark are the contradictions of the settlement policy with a stable two-state solution that even the Palestinian Authority, otherwise pliable to Israeli demands, has declared the ‘peace process’ meaningless as long as settlement growth is allowed to continue. 
Hence the mystery: why a goal presumably shared by all—a viable two-state solution—is being undermined so deliberately. Since the government of the State of Israel is run by people of incontestably high capabilities and talent who presumably see these implications as well as anyone else, the only reasonable conclusion is that the State’s true purpose and logic have not been correctly understood. 
The scholars of international law who were invited to contribute to this study were accordingly asked to examine Israel’s occupation afresh. Their task was not to displace the fact of belligerent occupation but to review the whole body of Israel’s practices to see whether, if filtered through the lenses of different legal instruments, new patterns would emerge to reveal a different whole. Establishing the theoretical framework for this project proved more complicated than expected and consumed months: especially, how to apply international humanitarian and human rights law within one setting. But once the framework was established, the empirical review flowed readily and the conclusions gelled swiftly: Israel’s many discrete violations of international humanitarian law, when considered holistically in light of human rights law, were found to constitute two distinct and comprehensive regimes which are both considered inimical to international peace and security: namely, colonialism and apartheid. It has been the collective failure of the international community to recognise and address Israel’s imposition of these regimes that has stalled all progress toward ending the conflict. And if this neglect continues—if the doctrines and agendas driving Israel’s strategic objectives are not recognised, and the specific offenses they entail do not draw the international action stipulated by related law—then the conflict will most certainly remain immune to all efforts to resolve it. 
Finding that Israel is practicing apartheid and colonialism indeed explains why mediation and negotiations to date have proved so unproductive. For at least thirty years, the liberal model of conflict resolution has uncritically adopted the Israeli government’s claims that its main concern is fear of Arab attack. Hence peace talks have focussed on improving Israel’s security—or at least, the government’s sense of it—and addressing what are assumed to be mutual ‘hatreds’. This approach has inspired a ream of projects to forge Israeli-Palestinian agreements on matters such as border controls, as well as encourage ‘dialogue’ at various levels, from summit meetings among heads of state to summer camps for Jewish and Palestinian youth. The general goal of all these measures was to build mutual ‘confidence’ and ‘understanding’. And yet, despite ephemeral flashes of seeming accomplishment, none has had long-term benefits or even deflected Israel’s policies in the occupied territories to any meaningful extent. 
This book reveals why this is so: because all have missed the real point. Colonialism is not driven by ‘hatred’. It is a foreign grab for land and resources (here including symbolic resources, such as sacred sites) enabled by superior military power. Thus a colonial conflict is not resolved by getting people to ‘see each other as human beings’ but by addressing the basic injustice of foreign domination and restoring the people’s capacity to exercise their right to self-determination. Similarly, an apartheid regime is not created out of ‘misunderstanding’, but to serve a group’s survival agenda by physically excluding other groups—a policy that has little to do with the nature of others except that they are, by definition, others. A group that believes it cannot survive and flourish with others, and so must absolutely dominate others to preserve a life-world essential to its own cultural or physical survival, will remain concerned to maintain that domination no matter what others do or say or any underlying justice of their demands.
As domination is inherent to both colonialism and apartheid, it inevitably triggers resistance, sometimes armed, by the dominated group. Unfortunately, resistance is then seen by the dominator as confirming the necessity for domination and even legitimising its intensification, which inevitably offends people more deeply and generates more resistance. Resolving this vicious cycle too often focuses on the violence of the resistance. Yet the well-spring of violence is the logic and project of domination, not the resistance it inspires. International law recognises this fact in denouncing colonialism and apartheid, holding that conflict is inherent to both regimes and will continue until they are ended—that is, when the root logics, values and practices of domination are identified, discredited and defeated. 
When we consider that Israel’s occupation has assumed the character of colonial and apartheid regimes, which by definition have domination as their central purpose, the apparent mysteries of the failed ‘peace process’ fall away. We can at last recognise that Israel’s first concern is not with Palestinian or Arab (or Iranian, or other) attack, but with maintaining absolute domination (demographic, political, cultural, juridical) by Jewish people over non-Jewish people in territory under Israel’s sway. This domination is indeed treated as nonnegotiable, as an overwhelming Jewish majority is deemed essential to enabling Israel’s existence as a ‘Jewish state’. This tenet draws ideologically from centuries of past cruelties and atrocities committed against Jews, but it is not simply defensive. In Zionist thought, sustaining an overwhelming Jewish majority is the essential condition for an ennobling project of cultural, religious and political construction undertaken collectively by the entire Jewish people.  This proactive vision is indeed essential to giving Zionism its romantic gloss of Jewish-national liberation. But a logic of demographic engineering, when deployed in a modern territorial state, stumbles into a fatal moral error regarding outsiders: it requires dominating them.
This essential moral flaw in the Jewish-state project has been overlooked by too many outsiders, especially sympathetic westerners whose knowledge of anti-Semitism is intimate and whose Christian majorities are prone to view the whole Zionist project in biblical soft-focus.  Nonetheless, that moral flaw must be faced now, dispassionately, for pragmatic reasons. It is a matter of historical record that the Zionist project to establish and maintain an overwhelming Jewish majority in Mandate Palestine has driven every event shaping the present conflict: to take just a few highlights, the early purchases of land by the Jewish Agency in the 1920s, coupled with the systematic exclusion of Palestinian labour, which triggered mass Arab unrest and rebellion; the forced transfer of hundreds of thousands of Arabs and razing of hundreds of Palestinian villages by Zionist forces in 1948, generating the Palestinian refugee problem; and Israel’s dividing the West Bank into exclusive ethnic enclaves today, entrapping five million Palestinians in a permanent condition of statelessness and therefore unending resistance. The same doctrine drives Israel’s systematic political marginalisation of over a million Palestinian citizens of Israel and its refusal to allow the return of Palestinian refugees who have property, ancestral ties and rights in the country. 
Recognizing that Israel’s logic of territorial-demographic domination has shaped the entire conflict also illuminates why a stable peace has so far proved impossible: because a doctrine of domination creates its own insecurity. The apartheid regime in South Africa found it could not stabilise apartheid within the country because its agenda to maintain white-racial supremacy generated a permanent security dilemma that inevitably spilled across South Africa’s borders. Perceiving a ‘total onslaught’ against apartheid, the regime felt compelled to raise a ‘total response’ of military and covert action against its opponents, including by bombings and assassinations. Israel faces the same intrinsic dilemma: it cannot maintain ethnic domination domestically without destabilising its borders on all fronts. This inherent instability then generates Israeli perceptions of a generic campaign of ‘terror’ against Israel, comprised not only of actual terrorist acts but any kind of resistance to Israel’s policies—even the moral ‘delegitimation’ of the international divestment, boycott and sanctions campaign. Perception of this (genuinely ‘terrifying’) existential threat then legitimises—even glorifies—Israel’s ‘total response’ in ruthless military terms: that is, ongoing military rule in the OPT; the shocking assault on Gaza in Operation ‘Cast Lead’; periodic military invasions of Lebanon; proxy invasions and occupations (by its United States ally) of Iraq and Afghanistan; perilous brinksmanship with Iran; subversion in Syria, and alliances with Arab dictatorships and monarchies that have found their own advantages in helping Israel resist the ‘demographic threat’ posed to Jewish statehood by the Palestinians.
How best to address and unravel Israel’s commitment to domination in Palestine, which cannot help but generate these dangers for international security? This question goes well beyond the scope of international law, which provides only that states have general obligations to end colonialism and apartheid. Nonetheless, international human rights law does provide one crucial key to moving forward, in providing a vital new insight: territorial partition will not help. Colonialism might be ended simply by a foreign power’s withdrawal, if the people’s self-determination is truly enabled by this, but apartheid is not ended by moving a border. South Africa’s withdrawal from Namibia (then South West Africa) hardly signified that the white government was absolved of the crime of apartheid inside South Africa and the conflict within South Africa retained all its force and violence after that withdrawal. The conflict in South Africa reflected not the incongruence of borders with legitimate white rule, but the logic of white domination, which flowed from the belief that domination was essential to preserving white culture, democracy and civilisation. This belief then appeared to justify systematically repressing black South Africans solely because their very existence, in their disenfranchised millions, threatened white society in its racially exclusive form. Similarly, Palestinians are repressed because they threaten Jewish statehood, through their mere existence as ‘non-Jews’, in their millions and in their deep attachment to their native land. 
The gist of the findings presented in this book builds from this premise: apartheid within any country—whether the dominant group is a minority or a majority—is truly ended only by eliminating the doctrine of domination that steers the State to authorise its officials to commit what the Apartheid Convention calls ‘inhuman acts’. Thus the findings here clarify that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict will not be resolved by final status talks that establish various ‘security guarantees’ or fine-tune the 1949 Armistice line. It will be resolved only when the logic of ethno-racial domination is defeated. 
How to do this? Discarding a doctrine of ethnic or racial domination whole cloth is never easy for any group. It requires not only prodigious leaps of faith—typically undertaken by both sides only when faced as absolutely necessary—but collectively re-imagining the nature of the conflict itself, which involves dismantling some deeply held beliefs. Here the limitations of international law again become obvious, for it cannot advise or even describe such a process. Law is helpless to address even some concepts shaping its own principles: not least, as discussed in this book, what is a ‘race’; under what conditions a given group is legally a ‘racial group’; what makes a group a ‘people’; or the periodic social reconstruction of a ‘people’ or ‘nation’ to serve different political goals. Thus the principle often cited here, ‘every people has the right to self-determination’, which all states are obliged to respect and uphold, falters before arguments about whether a given group truly has standing as a ‘people’. 
These arguments are typically heated, because they have existential implications for the states in which they live. Mandate Palestine is hardly unique in suffering from them. Hundreds of indigenous peoples around the world, despite decades of fraught negotiations, will bitterly attest that their state governments absolutely deny their claims to standing as ‘peoples’ in this crucial legal sense. Rivalries to define such identities—and, effectively, the nature of their conflicts—can therefore become the centre of disputes because, for those involved, they are matters of national survival. Just such an argument characterised the anti-apartheid struggle in South Africa, where African political philosophers and activists rejected the apartheid regime’s discursive division of South Africa’s population into distinct ‘peoples’—white, Indian, and the black ‘peoples’ of the Zulu, Xhosa, Twana and so forth—by insisting that South Africa was really one nation, wrongfully divided by a racist doctrine, and that the country ‘belongs to all who live in it’.
Such meta-conflicts are conducted by people at the coal-face of conflicts, who realise the need for them, and while they draw on international law, they are essentially matters of social and political construction. This study of international law can therefore only suggest that a reconstruction of the conflict in Israel-Palestine is warranted and could illuminate hitherto unimagined routes toward its resolution. Thoughtful readers will recognise that this potential shift in direction is precisely the deeper paradigm shift suggested by this book: not just that different international law might be applicable, but that the conflict’s very nature may be rethought. Occupation may arguably end when a foreign power’s withdrawal allows the people control over their affairs. But colonialism is not ended by a withdrawal that still denies the people the full expression of their right to self-determination, nor is apartheid ended by moving a border. Both are truly ended only when the doctrine of domination that drives them is finally identified, opposed and ended.
***
Concluding that Israel is practicing apartheid and colonialism was not done here either easily or lightly. The rigour of the scholarship in this book—which may sometimes tire non-specialists—reflects keen appreciation of its editor and all its contributors that the highest scholarly standard is due to matters of such gravity. It should therefore be made clear from the start that this study does not spring from polemics on the conflict. The term ‘apartheid’ has been slung about for years among activist circles, particularly regarding Israel’s monolithic Wall (‘security barrier’), but this polemical usage has not been illuminating. Many ethnic conflicts involve barriers, checkpoints, discrimination, even ethnic cantons. Determining whether Israel’s practices truly accord with apartheid or colonialism, as suggested originally by UN Special Rapporteur John Dugard, required reopening the law books and carefully scrutinizing their definitions, related commentary and theory. The tortuous scholarly project that emerged included contributions of many people, mostly scholars of international law but also sociologists and political scientists (including the editor).
This book began its life as a report to the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA, now the Department of International Relations and Cooperation) of the Republic of South Africa. It was conducted as part of the Middle East Project, an independent two-year project based at the Human Sciences Research Council of South Africa (HSRC) which was established to conduct analysis of Middle East politics relevant to South African foreign policy. That project, led by the editor of this book, was wholly funded by DFA, and a report on whether Israel’s policies were truly consistent with colonialism and apartheid was requested by the Deputy Minister. However, the resulting report and the present book do not represent or suggest any views held by the Government of South Africa, nor does it constitute an official position of the HSRC. 
Originally planned as a four-month study, the primary research on this project extended to nearly two years and the report went through several complete drafts, followed by a thorough revision in 2011 for Pluto Press. The scholars who were invited to contribute to the study’s conceptual development, theory-building, data-gathering and drafting were involved to varying degrees at different stages over several years. Consequently, no chapter, section or even subsection of this book is entirely solo-authored and no one can claim full ‘ownership’ of any of it. Still, special credit can be extended, particularly to a core group of people who developed the study’s theoretical framework and drafted sections of the original report, which the editor then had the formidable task of reordering and editing for logical flow, empirical consistency, citations and style. 
The first thanks must be to the tremendous contribution by Iain Scobbie, Sir Joseph Hotung Research Professor in Law, Human Rights and Peace Building in the Middle East, in the School of Law at SOAS. Much of the material in Chapter Two traces to his ground-breaking scholarship for this study and he was principally responsible for the analysis of colonialism in Chapter Three, as well as a myriad of insights, corrections, shorter drafted sections and general intellectual oversight. His wisdom as a senior scholar of international law provided intellectual leadership throughout several meetings of the contributors on successive drafts. Formidable and brilliant human rights lawyers Hassan Jabareen and Rina Rosenberg, respectively founding Director and International Advocacy Director of the Adalah Legal Centre for Arab Minority Rights in Israel (Haifa), were invaluable in consulting on the study’s theory and method and providing much of the legal documentation by arranging access to Adalah’s archives of human rights reports and legal cases. Sections in this book on Israel’s Supreme Court decisions, many others, trace principally to their work. Also contributing vital theoretical insight and fine collegial support, as well as most of the material on South African apartheid law, was Max du Plessis, Professor of Law at the University of KwaZulu-Natal (Durban). John Reynolds, initially from his position at al-Haq, was involved consistently throughout the study and assembled much of the enormous volume of empirical material in Chapter Four—work that brings further thanks to Al-Haq Director Shawan Jabareen, who authorised John’s time and generous access to Al-Haq’s archives. Throughout the project and especially in the early organisational stages, Victor Kattan was a bastion, and significant contributions to early editorial meetings and draft sections were made by Shane Darcy and Michael Kearney. Special gratitude is extended to Iain, Rina and John for helping the revision for Pluto Press in 2011. 
Other advisors in early stages of the original report included lawyer Michael Sfard (Tel Aviv), whose staff contributed some draft material to Chapter Two; Gilbert Marcus, Senior Counsel and Constitutional Lawyer (Johannesburg); and Professor Daphna Golan, Director of the Minerva Centre for Human Rights in the Faculty of Law at the Hebrew University (Jerusalem). Professor John Dugard, who provided the original inspiration for this study (through his capacity as Special Rapporteur on human rights in the OPT, as noted in Chapter One), was not involved directly in the study due to his UN role, but generously provided doses of good sense and scholarly insight whenever requested. 
Archival research, which provided the empirical meat and potatoes of this study, was conducted by many people: at Adalah, these included Fatmeh el-Ajou, Rana Asali, Katie Hesketh, and Belkis Wille; at al-Haq, Michelle Burgis, Gareth Gleed, Lisa Monaghan, Fadi Quran, and Mays Warrad; and in South Africa, Godfrey Musila, then at the South African Institute for Advanced Constitutional, Public, Human Rights and International Law (Johannesburg). Stephanie Khoury provided valuable comments on some early draft sections. Thanks are also warmly due to outside readers, whose comments were immensely valuable to the final version: here this book owes a particular debt of gratitude to professors Christine Chinkin, Omar Dajani, George Bisharat and Orna Ben-Naftali, as well as John Quigley. The study also received comments from Jody Kollapen when he was serving as CEO of the South African Commission on Human Rights (Pretoria).
Respectful gratitude is also expressed to those who made original project possible in 2007–2009. First among these is Aziz Pahad, then Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Republic of South Africa, who supervised the HSRC’s Middle East Project. Thanks are due also, and especially, to Ronnie Kasrils, former Minister of Intelligence Services for the Republic of South Africa. At the HSRC, Professor Adam Habib helped to launch the Middle East Project, in his capacity as Director of the Democracy and Governance Programme, while Director Adrian Hadland provided oversight and MEP assistant Tania Fraser assisted wonderfully in organising the report’s printing and release in Cape Town. Sarah Hibbin and other staff at the Sir Joseph Hotung Project did valiant work in organising the public release of the unedited study in May 2009 at SOAS. At DFA, Douw Vermaak, at the Middle East Desk, served most helpfully as liaison and Pieter A. Stemmet assisted with coordination, in an observer capacity, as DFA Advocate and Senior State Law Advisor. 
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